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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
REBECCA McKELL, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
SPANISH FORK CITY, a Municipal 
Corporation, et al, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
CASE 
NO. 8494 
Brief of Defendant and Respondent 
Spanish Fork City 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents agree in substance with the procedural 
steps as outlined in appellant's "Statement of Case." We 
desire, however, to more fully discuss some of those steps 
which were merely touched upon by appellant. With re-
spect to the remaining facts, appellant has simply mentioned 
carefully selected extracts and that part of the testimony 
which she believes suppo,rts her theory, a theory rejected 
by the Court. Respondent will endeavor to summarize the 
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evidence with respect to only those facts covered by appel-
lant which we believe are not supported by the evidence. 
This action was brought to recover damages to the land 
and personal property of plaintiff caused by errant flood 
waters which had escaped the natural channel of the Span-
ish Fork River and which plaintiff claimed were diverted 
across plaintiff's land by raising the elevation of a certain 
county road, and by blasting with dynamite a section of a 
ditch bank along the East line of plaintiff's property (R. 
4 to 9 inclusive). The original basis of plaintiff's claim was 
under a trespass theory. Motions to dismiss were filed by 
all defendants (R. 59, 60, 61, and 62). In ruling on the mo-
tion of Spanish Fork City to dismiss, District Judge Wm. 
Stanley 1Dunford in his memorandum decision dated April 
10, 1953, was of the opinion that defendant Spanish Fork 
City acted in a governmental capacity and that the motion 
of Spanish Fork City ought to be granted (R. 16 to 19 inclu-
sive). On pages R. 18 and 19, Judge Dunford stated: 
"However, because of the disconnection in time 
and circumstances between building of the dike and 
blasting of the trees, etc., and because the problems 
suggested by this memorandum could not reasonably 
have been foreseen by the plaintiff at the making of 
his complaint against so many defendants, the plain-
tiff should have an opportunity to state a cause against 
the City if the facts warrant it under the holding of 
this memorandum." 
Thereafter, on April 18, 1953, plaintiff filed an amen-
ded complaint, which again was based upon a trespass the-
ory (R. 20 to 32 inclusive). Defendant Spanish Fork City 
again filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint (R. 
60). Defendant's motion to dismiss was denied, as shown 
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by Judge !Dunford's memorandum decision dated May 26, 
1953 (iR. 33 to 39 inclusive). Judge Dunford pointed out 
therein that even though the amended complaint was not 
founded on the taking of private property for public use, 
which theory was raised for the first time by counsel for 
the plaintiff in his oral argument on the motion to dismiss, 
the amended complaint, it was held, did state a cause of 
action. Thereafter plaintiff filed an amendment to the 
amended complaint (R. 54). Subsequently, defendant Utah 
County, together with the State of Utah, (not a party to 
this action), each paid plaintiff $2,000.00, making a total 
of $4,000.00, in full settlement of their differences. As a re-
sult thereof, plaintiff dismissed the action against defend-
ants Utah County, its individual commissioners and em-
ployees. In addition thereto, plaintiff dismissed the action 
against defendants William R. Jex, Roy Bradford, Francis 
Lundell, JohnS. Davis, and Wendell Bradford without any 
consideration moving from them to the plaintiff (R. 63 and 
64). 
Thereafter, the remaining defendants filed a motion 
for summary judgment (R. 68). The motion for swnmary 
judgment was denied by Judge Dunford with certain quali-
fications as shown by his memorandum decision dated Au-
gust 10, 1954 (R. 70 to 78 inclusive). 
Prior to the time set for trial, District Judge Wm. Stan-
ley Dunford passed away, and District Judge Maurice Har-
ding was appointed his successor. The case came on for 
trial and was heard by District Judge Maurice Harding. 
Defendants proceeded in accordance with the trial court's 
memorandum of authorities. Plaintiff offered evidence in 
an effort to show that defendant Spanish Fork City par-
ticipated in raising the elevation of the county road, which 
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evidence was received over the objections of the defend-
ants (Tr. 6 and 13). 
At the conclusion of plaintiff's case, a motion was made 
by the defendants for an involuntary, dismissal on the 
grounds that the defendant Spanish Fork City was acting 
in a governmental capacity, and was not liable to plaintiff 
as a matter of law (Tr. 201 and 202), which was denied 
(Tr. 204). 
The jury found in favor of the plaintiff and assessed 
her damage only against defendant Spanish Fork City, and 
found no cause of action against the individual officers and 
employees of defendant Spanish Fork City (R. 123). 
Thereafter, upon motion of counsel for defendant Spanish 
Fork City, the Court set aside the verdict and granted judg-
ment in favor of defendant Spanish Fork City and against 
the plaintiff, no cause of action (R. 135 and 136). 
The Spanish Fork River heads in the top of the East 
slope of the Wasatch Mountains and courses, in a general 
Northwesterly direction through Utah Valley to Utah Lake. 
The natural channel passes through the West portion of 
plaintiff's land where it meanders around several pronounced 
curves. (See defendant's Exhibit No. 26). 
In the month of March, 1952, there was an above av-
erage cover of snow on the water shed of the Spanish Fork 
River. Since the mean temperature during the early spring 
months was below average, the snow was being held on the 
lower water shed, which otherwise would have. begun to 
melt. It was anticipated that if the temperature should 
climb above average for a sustained period, that a large 
volume of water would be discharged through the Spanish 
Fork River (Tr. 121 and 122). 
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Although it was generally anticipated that a flood 
would occur, no one anticipated that it would reach the mag-
nitude that it did (Tr. 122). In anticipation of the poten-
tial flood hazard, a number of farmers owning land adja-
cent to the Spanish Fork River and a number of individ-
uals owning residential property near the river bottom, 
both inside and outside of the corporate limits of Spanish 
Fork City, held several meetings for the purpose of com-
bining their efforts to protect their properties in the event 
that the Spanish Fork River should overflow its banks (Tr. 
244 and 252). DeanS. Ludlow testified that A. T. McKell, 
the original plaintiff, attended some of the meetings (Tr. 
245). Plaintiff, Rebecca McKell, testified that to her knowl-
edge, A. T. McKell did not attend any of the meetings (Tr. 
329 and 330). A committee of land owners was selected to 
determine what could be done to alleviate the threat of the 
flood (Tr. 245). In an effort to gain help from Spanish 
Fork City, a meeting was held with the Spanish Fork City 
Council at the request of the committee members (Tr. 245, 
246, 261, 286, 288, and 315). At the meeting, the com-
mittee members requested that a representative from the 
Spanish Fork City Council be placed on the committee to 
facilitate the acquisition of equipment if necessary (Tr. 
261). Ed M. Beck was so appointed, and the committee 
selected its own chairman (Tr. 92, 93, 261, and 321). The 
committee members requested that their names be placed 
in the minutes of the Council meeting, which accordingly 
was done (Tr. 92, 93, and 261). The committee was not 
appointed by the Spanish Fork City Council (Tr. 261, 286, 
287, and 321). 
The potential flood condition was surveyed by several 
groups of officials to determine what action should be taken. 
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The survey revealed that flood waters which might over-
flow the East bank of the Spanish Fork River could cause 
serious damage and destruction to the gravel county road 
which extended Easterly from the Northeast corner of the 
plaintiff's property ,privately owned farm lands extending 
North from the county road, property owned by Spanish 
Fork City upon which there existed buildings, sheds, stock 
yards, and a race track, a public school and seminary build-
ing, a railroad bridge and trestle, U.S. Highway No. 91 and 
large concrete bridge structure, and private residential prop-
erty owned by citizens of Spanish Fork City within its cor-
porate limits in the Northwest part thereof (Tr. 8, 9, 29, and 
33). It was suggested by General West, a member of the 
Civil Defense Committee of the State of Utah, (Tr. 6, 276), 
that the county road extending east from the Northeast cor-
ner of plaintiff's land be raised. The purpose of raising the 
road was to protect the above properties (Tr. 27, 29, and 
249). In response to a request by Utah County for assis-
tance, a meeting of the Spanish Fork City Council was held 
wherein the Council voted to send some City-owned trucks 
to help the County raise the road (Tr. 277). The Spanish 
Fork City Council approved an oral cooperative agreement 
between Spanish Fork City, Utah County, and the State of 
Utah, whereby Spanish Fork City was to furnish $2,000.00 
in labor to assist in raising the level of a county road as 
shown by the following minute entry of Spanish Fork City 
dated April 11, 1952, which, incidentally, is incorrectly quo-
ted in appellant's brief: 
"Councilman Anderson moved that we go along 
with the County and State in furnishing $2,000.00 worth 
of labor along with the County and State $2,000.00 each 
on dike road, and to do all we can to cooperate with 
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County and State in construction of road dike and to 
authorize mayor and recorder to sign county agree-
ment." 
The oral cooperative agreement was later reduced to 
writing and was signed by the officials in Spanish Fork City 
on June 4, 1952, which was some time after the flooding 
took place (Tr. 16). (See defendant's Exhibit No. 1). 
The officials of Spanish Fork City and Utah County 
deemed it advisable to procure a written release or waiver 
from the land owners along the Spanish Fork River for any 
damage resulting from the flood control work prior to the 
performance of any work (Tr. 92 and 309). In accordance 
with the foregoing, on April 2, 1952, a written instrument 
entitled "Release" was executed by a number of the owners 
of land adjacent to the Spanish Fork River. Included 
among the signers was A. T. McKell, the original plaintiff 
in this action. (See defendant's Exhibit No. 39. Tr. 198 
and 303). 
A canal known as the Bradford ditch runs along the 
East boundary of plaintiff's land. (See defendant's Exhibit 
No. 26). (Tr. 83). Plaintiff's land is irrigated with waters 
from the Bradford ditch, as is the land situated immedi-
ately East. (See defendant's Exhibit No. 26 and Tr. 89). 
The general slope of the land East of the river is in a North-
westerly direction, i. e., towards the river channel as shown 
by the course of the flood water in defendant's Exhibit No. 
3. The land immediately East of plaintiff's land has a very 
slight slope to the East, being about one and three-fourths 
inches per hundred feet, and a slope of three-fourths inch 
per hundred feet to the North, and is irrigated to the North-
east (Tr. 65). 
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Although the land has been irrigated in that direction 
as long as the witness Clifford McKell, who owned the land 
for the past twenty-five years, could remember, the only 
logical conclusion is that at one time the land was graded 
with a slope to the Northeast, so that it could be irrigated 
from the Bradford ditch. 
The banks of the Bradford ditch are higher than either 
the plaintiff's land or the land to the East thereof. (See 
plaintiff's Exhibit No. 6). The Bradford ditch has always 
passed under the county road by means of a culvert, and 
at that point the elevation of the road has always been high-
er than the banks of the ditch (Tr. 23, 83, and 250). The 
elevation of the county road was higher than the land im-
mediately South thereof prior to the raising of the eleva-
tion of the road (Tr. 250). 
:During the latter part of the month of April, 1952, the 
river began overflowing its East banks approximately one 
to one and one-half miles Southeasterly from plaintiff's 
property (Tr. 10). The course of the flood water was in a 
general Northwesterly direction, and its path of destruc-
tion is clearly shown in defendant's Exhibit No. 3. 
As the errant flood waters innundated a large area of 
land East of the river and coursed their way in a general 
Northwesterly direction towards the county road, it be-
came apparent that to save and protect the county road, 
the state highway and bridge, Spanish Fork City property, 
and privately owned farm land, and residential property 
owned by citizens of Spanish Fork City within its corpo-
rate limits, the elevation of the county road had to be 
raised (Tr. 7). Two trucks owned by Spanish Fork City 
were loaned to Utah County and were placed under its su-
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pervision (Tr. 33, 280, and 283). There was a total of 
seven or eight trucks which worked steadily for three or 
four days and nights hauling gravel to raise the elevation 
of the road (Tr. 15). The elevation of the road was raised 
about two feet on the East and about four feet on the West 
(Tr. 26). 
Upon reaching the county road, which extends Easterly 
from the Northeast corner of plaintiff's property, the errant 
flood waters were impounded and prevented, at least tem .. 
porarily, from proceeding any further North. The eleva-
tion of the impounded flood waters gradually raised, and 
when it exceeded the elevation of the bank of the Bradford 
ditch, the water began overflowing to the West onto and 
over the plaintiff's lands and back into the river. The flood 
water overflowed the bank of the Bradford ditch approxi-
mately two to three feet deep, and for a distance of from 
fifty to seventy-five yards, and began washing gulleys, rivu-
lets, and fingers, thereby washing away the top soil over 
a considerable area along the Northern portion of plaintiff's 
land (Tr. 20, 21, 101, 107, 116, and 257). 
Thereafter, the original plaintiff, A. T. McKell, went to 
the place of business of William R. Jex and asked if Mr. Jex 
could do something to confine the water washing across 
plaintiff's property into one channel to save his property 
from being entirely washed away (Tr. 254, 255). In re-
sponse to the request of Mr. A. T. McKell, Mr. Jex contac-
ted Francis Lundell, and together they set a series of dyna-
mite charges known as ditching powder along the Northern 
portion of plaintiff's land, beginning on the West near the 
McKell barn, where the water had already cut the land 
back, and extending East to and including the West bank 
of the Bradford ditch (Tr. 103). The first blasting occurred 
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on the night of April 26, 1952 (Tr. 102, 188, and 255). A 
few days later, Arthur T. McKell again went to William Jex 
and asked that a second hole be cut through the Bradford 
ditch (Tr. 256). In response to Mr. McKell's request, Messrs. 
J ex and Lundell blew out a second channel through the West 
bank of the Bradford ditch a short distance South from the 
original cut (Tr. 102, 256). 
There is not one scintilla of evidence to show that either 
William R. J ex or Francis Lundell were employed by or 
were authorized or acted for Spanish Fork City to do any 
blasting whatever. In fact, all of the evidence shows other-
wise (Tr. 256, 286). 
The only evidence touching on the exact acreage of 
plaintiff's land washed away by the flood waters was the 
testimony of Hugo Price, a registered, professional engi-
neer and land surveyor, and defendant's Exhibit No. 26, 
which was a map prepared by Mr. Price in January, 1953, 
when he was Utah County Engineer. The evidence showed 
that 7.6 acres. of river bottom land had been washed away 
by the turbulent flood waters which remained in the natu-
ral channel. (See defendant's Exhibit No. 26, Tr. 209). A 
total of 1.87 acres of plaintiff's land had been washed away 
by the errant flood waters which had escaped the natural 
channel. Plaintiff contends that he could have saved some 
land along the river bottom and machinery if the flood had 
not prevented him from reaching that land. (See deposi-
tion of A. T. McKell, page 9). Mr. Francis Lundell testi-
fied that the South end of the McKell property could have 
been reached by wearing hip boots at any time that he was 
there during the flood (Tr. 117). 
On May 4, 1952, the Spanish Fork River reached a peak 
flow of 3500 second feet of water, measured in the mouth 
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of the canyon at Castilla. The highest flow at flood stage 
previously recorded was 1520 second feet in 1920. (See de-
fendant's Exhibit No. 29, Tr. 220). Thus it can be seen 
that the flow in 1952 was approximately 2000 second feet 
higher, which was more than twice as high as any previous 
recorded flow at flood stage. Francis Lundell testified that 
he had lived at Benjamin, Utah, for sixty-one years, and 
he had never before seen such a flood (Tr. 113). 
A careful and exhaustive review of the entire record 
reveals that the only thing that Spanish Fork City or its 
officers had to do with the flood water which caused the 
damage complained of was to lend to Utah County the use 
of two city-owned trucks, which were under the supervi-
sion of the county for three or four days in hauling gravel 
to raise the elevation of the county road. It is upon this 
fact, and this fact alone, that appellant asks that this Court 
reinstate the verdict of the jury. 
STAT~T OF POINTS 
We shall follow the general order of the points speci-
fied in appellant's brief, although we believe it unneces-
sary to answer all points raised by appellant to sustain the 
decision of the trial court. Respondent desires to present 
two additional points which are enumerated as Point VII 
and Point VIII and will be fully discussed hereafter. We 
shall endeavor to cover each point in the order enumerated. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMIT-
TING THE DEFENDANT SPANISH F10RK CITY TO 
AMEND ITS PLEADINGS BY STRIKING FROM THE 
ANSWER THE ALLEGATIONS TO THE EFFECT THAT 
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THE DAMAGE SUSTAINED BY THE PLAINTIFF WAS 
CAUSED BY A CHANGE IN THE COURSE OF THE 
RIVER, AND SUBSTITUTING THE ALLEGATION THAT 
THE nEFENDANT HAD A RIGHT SO TO DO WHAT 
WAS DONE BECAUSE OF THE EXISTENCE OF AN 
EMERGENCY TO PROTECT ITS PROPERTY FROM A 
COMMON ENEMY. 
Rule 15 (b) , Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides 
in effect that amendments to the pleadings may be made 
at any time, even after judgment, to cause the pleadings 
to conform to the evidence. 
Particular liberality is shown by the courts in allow-
ing amendments to defendants answer, in order that there 
may be a trial on the merits. However, the allowance or 
refusal to defendant of permission to amend is ordinarily 
regarded as resting within the sound discretion of the court 
(71 C. J. S. Par. 294, P. 670). An amendment of an an-
swer to deny a fact that has been admitted, or to admit a 
fact that has been denied is addressed to the discretion of 
the trial court (71 C. J. S. 296(f) P. 677). LeCyr vs. Dow, 
30 Cal. 2d 457, 86 Pac. 2d 900). In the case of Hall vs. 
Gordon, 76 U. S. App. D. C. 33, 128 F 2d 461, it was held 
that permitting defendant at trial to amend answer to as-
sert an additional defense was not error. Courts are more 
liberal in allowing amendments to answers than CQmplaints. 
This liberality sometimes extends to the admission of en-
tirely new defenses. Cartwright vs. Ruffin, 43 Colo. 377, 
96 Pac. 261). The purpose of the Uberal rule was pointed 
out by this Court in the case of Hayden vs. Collins, 90 Utah 
238, 63 Pac. 2d 223). On page 225 it is stated: 
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"The person who brings an action, as distinguished 
from he who defends, has control of the action in the 
sense that he may choose the underlying set of facts 
which he thinks constitutes a cause of action against 
the defendant. There is reason then for saying that, 
after he so chooses a set of facts which he believes 
constitutes a cause of action, he should not be permit-
ted to shift to another cause of action. Not so with 
the defendant. The defendant has been brought into 
court and made to defend. Any set of facts which he 
may set up, whether sounding in contract or in tort 
and which would tend to defeat the claim of the plain-
tiff is permitted. And if he should, for the time, fail 
to set up some facts which would constitute an affirm-
ative defense or counterclaim, and then later conclude 
that these facts would constitute a good counterclaim 
or defense, he should 1be able to do so as long as they 
are not advanced at such a late date as to make the 
tardiness prejudicial to the plaintiff." 
Appellant has made no showing that the time at which 
respondents' motion to amend was made and granted was 
prejudicial to her. She made no motion for adjournment 
to procure further evidence to meet the amendment. (See 
Voltmann vs. United Fruit Company, C. C. A. N. Y. 1945, 
147 F. 2d 514). There is no showing whatever that the 
trial court abused its discretion in permitting the amend-
ment. 
There is no evidence to show that defendant Spanish 
Fork City had anything to do with any blasting or straight-
ening of the natural channel of the Spanish Fork River 
West of U. S. Highway No. 91. Mayor Nielsen unequivocally 
refused to authorize any blasting anywhere and specifically 
West of U.S. Highway No. 91 (Tr. 296). Francis Lundell 
testified that on his own initiative he used dynamite to blast 
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a new river channel West of U. S. Highway No. 91 (Tr. 
104). The only evidence with respect to any damages 
caused to plaintiff's property thereby was speculative and 
by conjecture (Tr. 104, 105). 
Appellant takes the position that the mere fact that 
respondent entered into an agreement with the State of 
Utah and Utah County to assist in flood prevention work, 
respondent assumed full responsibility for the rampaging 
Spanish Fork River and became an insurer for all damages 
left in its path of destruction. Not only is such position un-
tenable, but it is contrary to common sense and reason. 
Now appellant seeks to go even further and claims that the 
original allegation in respondents' answer, to the effect that 
by reason of changing the course of the river West of U. 
S. Highway No. 91 "and lowering the same ten or twelve 
feet, this made a heavy draw and washed out plaintiff's land 
and other lands above Highway No. 91" was an admission 
by respondent that might well have constituted negligence. 
We submit that the conclusion is absurd and the argument 
is without merit. In view of the fact that there was no evi-
dence to show that respondent had anything to do with the 
Spanish Fork River or channel West of U. S. Highway No. 
91, it properly exercised its discretion in permitting the 
amendment. Since a motion to amend the pleadings is ad-
dressed to the discretion of the trial court, the ruling on 
the motion to amend may not be reviewed on appeal, except 
for abuse of discretion. (Goodson vs. Goodson, 105 Cal. App. 
2d, 232 Pac. 2d 876. Lewis and Q. vs. S. Edmundson and 
Sons, 113 Cal. App. 2d 705, 248 Pac. 2d 973). 
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POINT II 
.. THE EVIDENCE SHOWED THAT PLAINTIFF RE-
LEASED THE DEFENDANT CITY FROM LIABILITY 
FOR THE DAMAGES COMPLAINED OF." 
The best evidence of the release from liability is the 
written instrument itself, which bears the signature of A. 
T. McKell, the original plaintiff. (See defendant's Exhibit 
No. 39, Tr. 198 and 303). The first paragraph generally 
describes the activities from which respondent was relieved 
of liability if any damages resulted to the property owners 
thereby. The second paragraph, which was omitted from 
appellant's brief on pages 6 and 7, is as follows: 
"This release shall be effective from date hereof 
until the end of 1952, and shall release the above bodies 
politic fom any liability whatsoever whether by reason 
of the above described activities or by reason of mov-
ing equipment, men, or supplies onto the land owned 
by the signers and the signers hereto expressly give 
the above described bodies politic, or their agents, free 
access to the land in order to undertake flood control 
or prevention work along the said Spanish Fork River, 
its canals, or tributaries." 
A. T. McKell testified on direct examination that all 
he signed was permission to take heavy equipment across 
his land to clean out the river (Deposition of McKell, page 
18). On cross examination, he testified that he intended 
to agree to whatever the agreement said and what he signed, 
he agreed to because he read it (Deposition of A. T. Mc-
Kell, page 19). The release was taken to A. T. McKell for 
his signature by Garland Swensen. Mr. Swensen testified 
that there was no conversation about the purpose of the 
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release except as to the flood condition (Tr. 302). Mr. Mc-
Kell read the document and raised no question or objec-
tion (Tr. 198, 303). The position taken by appellant and 
a~serted during the entire trial, that A. T. McKell consented 
only to allowing equipment to be brought across his land 
to clean out the river is contrary to the express wording of 
the release. In the second paragraph it provides that: 
". . . . . . and shall release the above bodies poli-
tic from any liability whatsoever by reason of the 
above described activities or by reason of moving 
equipment, men, or supplies onto the land owned by 
the signers." 
It is clearly manifested that the release of liability 
through moving the equipment is in addition to the release 
of liability from the activities described in the first para-
graph thereof. Appellant attempts to narrow and restrict 
the interpretation of the instrument to cover only a release 
of liability for doing work along the Spanish Fork River 
channel to keep the water from overflowing its banks. Such 
contention is again contrary to the express wording of the 
instrument. In the first paragraph it provides that: 
". . . . . . do hereby release . . . . . . the City of 
Spanish Fork from any liability for damage to any real 
or personal property owned by the signers hereto in 
the above described sections along the Spanish Fork 
River, or along its canals and tributaries." 
It is clear, therefore, that the release covers activities 
along the various canals which divert water from the Span-
ish Fork River at places which may be distant from the 
natural channel. The wording of the release is very general, 
and covers any work to alleviate flood conditions. The evi-
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dence shows that the bodies politic named in the release 
were insistent that the property owners sign such a waiver 
before they would undertake any measures for any flood 
prevention work (Tr. 92, 309, 310). 
Respondent will concede that Mr. McKell did not con-
sent to have his farm destroyed. We contend that Mr. Mc-
Kell did consent to whatever action was necessary under 
the circumstances to save as much of his property as was 
possible. The testimony in the deposition of Mr. McKell 
as to what he intended in signing the release was given on 
the twenty-eighth day of April, 1954, approximately two 
years after the flood took p1ace. The actions of Mr. McKell 
at the time the release was signed, which was during the 
threat of a potential flood, are certainly inconsistent with his 
testimony given two years later, as shown by his deposition. 
Appellant apparently makes no claim that the release itself 
is invalid for any other reason. However, we desire to 
comment briefly on two aspects which may cause this Court 
some concern. 
Although a release ordinarily operates only with re-
spect to matters which are in existence at the time it is 
given, claims arising subsequently are discharged thereby 
if they fall within the fair import of the terms employed 
(76 C. J. S. Release, Paragraph 53). The doctrine that a 
release cannot discharge a future claim without such men-
tion of it is merely a canon of construction, and a release 
in general terms will serve to release such a claim if the 
intent is plain from the recitals thereof. (Altman vs. Cur-
tis Wright Corporation, C. C. A. N.Y. 124 F 2d 177). As 
a general rule, a release, in order to be effective, must be 
supported by a valuable consideration (76 C. J. S. Release, 
Section 10). However, there is an exception to the fore-
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going general rule where one has been induced by a release 
Without consideration to alter his position to his prejudice. 
Respondent concedes that the release recites no considera-
tion. However, the facts of this case fit squarely within 
the foregoing exception. Respondent would not have en-
gaged in any flood prevention work without a written re-
lease from the property owners. 
In reliance on the release, respondent loaned two trucks 
to the county to assist in raising the elevation of the county 
road and subjected itself to possible litigation. Respondent 
changed its position to its detriment, and appellant should 
be estopped from asserting a lack of consideration. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT SPANISH FORK CITY ACTED IN A 
GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION AND CANNOT BE HELD 
LIABLE FOR THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF. 
At the very beginning of this action, the trial court 
was of the opinion that assuming the allegations of the orgi-
nal complaint were true, Spanish Fork City was perform-
ing a governmental function, and could not be held to re-
spond in damages, as shown by the memorandum decision 
of Judge Wm. Stanley Dunford dated April 10, 1953 (R. 
16 to 19 inclusive). However, in his subsequent memo-
randum dated May 26, 1953, Judge Dunford expressed the 
opinion that the facts alleged in the amended complaint 
stated a cause of action under the theory that there was a 
taking or damaging of private property for a public use 
(R. 33 to 39 inclusive). Apparently Judge Dunford con-
cluded that if the private property of McKell was damaged 
for a public use, it is no defense to say that it was done in 
furtherance of a governmental function. 
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At the conclusion of plaintiff's case, defendant Spanish 
Fork City moved for an involuntary dismissal on the ground 
that plaintiff's evidence showed that the defendant City was 
performing a governmental function (Tr. 201). The mo-
tion was based upon the theory that the defendant City 
acted to protect the safety, health, and welfare of its in-
habitants and their properties. The motion was denied (Tr. 
204). Municipalities or other governmental subdivisions 
are not liable in damages for their negligence or the neg-
ligence of their officers and agents in the exercise of a gov-
ernmental function, but are liable in damages for negligence 
in the exercise of proprietary, municipal, or non-govern-
mental functions. (Sehey vs. Salt Lake City, 41 Utah 
535, 126 Pac. 691. Gillmor vs. Salt Lake City, 32 Utah 180, 
89 Pac. 714. Rollow vs. Ogden City, 66 Utah 475, 243 Pac. 
791. Niblock vs. Salt Lake City, 100 Utah 573, 111 Pac 2d 
800. Davis vs. Provo City Corp., 1 Utah 2d, 244, 265 Pac. 
2d 415. Ramerez vs. Ogden City, 3 Utah 2nd 102, 279 Pac. 
2d 463). 
There is a great divergence of opinion as to what acts 
or functions fall within one or the other of these categories. 
(See 38 Am. Jur. 261, Municipal Corporations, Section 572). 
This divergence of opinion seems to prevail on the question 
whether the construction of flood control measures consti-
tutes a governmental or merely a proprietary or municipal 
function. ( 5 A. L. R. 2d 57, Damage by Flood Protection 
Measures, Section 18). The foregoing annotation cites 
cases and gives circumstances under which it has been held 
that the municipality was acting in a governmental capa-
city and not liable for the negligence in the construction 
and maintenance of flood control works and the circum-
stances under which it has been held that the municipality 
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was acting in a proprietary capacity, and therefore liable. 
Appellant seems to emphasize the fact one of the properties 
respondent endeavored to protect was leased for a stock 
sale and is not the performance of a governmental func-
tion. In the case of Ramarez vs. Ogden City, supra, this 
Court held that the defendant City which owned a communi-
ty center employing a director to supervise recreational acti-
vities and contributed $6,000.00 per year, was engaged in a 
governmental and not in a proprietary activity and was 
not subject to tort liability. This Court pointed out on page 
465 that a governmental function must be something done 
or functioned for the general public good, and whether 
there is a special pecuniary beneficial profit to the munici-
pality, and whether the activity is of such a nature as to 
be in real competition with free enterprise are facts to be 
considered. In the case of Sehey vs. Salt Lake City, 41 
Utah 535, 126 Pac. 691, this Court held that where police 
officers of a City extended netting across a stream in an 
endeavor to recover the body of a drowned boy, the act was 
not in the discharge of any corporate power or function 
of the municipality or on account of any municipal benefit, 
but in discharge and in pursuance of· a mere governmental 
duty ,so that the City could not be held liable for the neg-
ligence and wrongful discharge of such duty whereby a 
portion of the wire remained in the stream and caused an 
obstruction of the flow. It has apparently been felt by 
I 
1 
some judges that there is something more sacred in rights .. ~ 
in land than in rights of personal liberty and security, but 
a close analysis of the decisions will show that this is not 
the generally accepted view. (38 Am. Jur. 280, Municipal 
Corporations, Section 584). 
There is some difference of opinion among the courts 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
\ 
21 
as to whether the riparian landowner is entitled to recover 
damages by way of compensation where as a result of the 
construction of flood control measures his land has been 
flooded or otherwise damaged. ( 5 A. L. R. 2d, 57, Damage 
by Flood Protection Measures, Section 4). 
Some authorities exist upholding the right to recover 
damages under the constitutional provision that private 
property shall not be taken or damaged for public use with-
out just compensation where the damage was direct and 
not merely consequential. (See cases cited in the forego--
ing annotation, page 60). 
There is considerable authority based upon various 
theories denying the right to recover damages or compen-
sation. The foregoing annotation contains a long list of 
cases so holding on pages 60 and 61. Under one theory the 
ground of the denial of a right to recover for damage to 
property not taken is that the construction of the flood con-
trol measure is an exercise of the police power of the State 
acting by its subordinate agencies; the theory of this view 
being that property may be summarily taken or destroyed 
in the exercise of the police power of the sovereign in the 
promotion of the protection of the health, safety, and se-
curity of the general public. (See cases cited on page 61 
of the foregoing anotation). The view is expressed in a 
number of cases that the constitutional provision as to the 
payment of compensation to a property owner for taking 
or damaging his property for public use does not contem-
plate a damage for a damnum absque injuria under the 
exercise of the police power, and that this constitutional 
provision has not modified the doctrine denying recovery 
for damage in the absence of a legal right. ( 5 A. L. R. 2d 
57, Section 12, and cases cited thereunder). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-.-----
22 
POINT IV 
THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE AS A MATTER 
OF JJAW JUSTIFIES THE VACATING OF THE VER-
DICT OF THE JURY AND THE GRANTING OF A JUDG-
MENT FOR THE DEFENDANT CITY NO'IWITHSTAND-
ING THE VERDICT BY REASON OF AN EMERGEN-
CY. 
An emergency does not always or necessarily imply 
suddenness or unforeseea:bleness or a temporary condition 
for it may also comprehend a pressing necessity or exig-
ency not necessarily wholly unexpected. This common mean-
ing depends greatly upon the special circumstances of each 
case. (29 C. J. S. 760, Emergency). Prior to the actual 
flooding it was generally known that a potential flood haz-
ard existed, and it was anticipated that a flood would occur 
if the temperature would rise above normal for a sus-
tained period. No one anticipated that the flood would 
reach the magnitude that it did (Tr. 122). Francis Lun-
dell, who lived in the vicinity of the Spanish Fork River 
for sixty-one years, testified that he had never before seen 
such a flood from the river (Tr. 113). The records show 
that on May 4, 1952, the flow of the Spanish Fork River 
was measured at 3500 second feet, being more than twice 
as high as any previously recorded flow at flood stage. 
(See defendant's Exhibit No. 29, Tr. 220). An extraordi-
nary flood is a flood not foreshadowed by the usual course 
of nature and . of such magnitude and destructiveness as 
could not have been anticipated or protected against by 
the exercise of ordinary foresight. (Wellman vs. Kelly, 197 
Oregon 553, 252 Pac. 2d 816). One cannot escape the conclu-
sion that the flow of the Spanish Fork River reached such 
I 
': 
' 
j 
\ 
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proportions and magnitude that an extraordinary flood oc-
curred. When the river began overflowing its banks, it 
changed from a naturally controlled force into a wild mon-
ster on the rampage, the waters threatening damage and de-
struction to man and property without discrimination to 
whichever stood in its way. Not only was the property 
owned by Spanish Fork City threatened, but so was plain-
tiff's property, a public school, a seminary building, a ran-
road bridge and trestle, a large concrete highway bridge 
structure, a state highway and residential property covering 
approximately one-fifth of Spanish Fork City (Tr. 8, 9, 29, 
33, 70, 71). We submit that then and there a great emer-
gency arose. Under such emergency conditions, Spanish 
Fork City loaned two trucks to Utah County for the purpose 
of raising the elevation of the county road to ward off and 
prevent the errant flood waters from flooding over the above 
property and thereby protect the same from damage and de-
struction. It was intended thereby to protect the property 
by keeping the water in the river, and it was not designed or 
intended to divert water across plaintiff's property (Tr. 
281, 282, 283). Appellant must concede that a little hind-
sight is better than a lot of foresight. We can look back 
now and criticize what was done or was not done and the 
good or bad that resulted therefrom. It must be remem-
bered that after the river began overflowing its banks, no 
one could anticipate the magnitude the flood would reach. 
Mayor Nielsen described the condition very well in his state-
ment: 
" . . . because at that time we did not know whether 
there would be ten feet of water or six inches." (Tr. 
284). 
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Under extraordinary water conditions, the landowner 
may use every reasonable precaution to prevent injury to his 
land, and whether his conduct is reasonable is determined 
by existing conditions and not subsequent consequences. 
(Jones vs. California Development Co., 173 Cal. 565, 160 
Pac. 823. Higgins vs. Monckton, 28 Cal. App. 2d 723, 83 
Pac. 2d 516). 
The rule is well stated in I Nichols on Eminent Domain, 
2d Edition, paragraph 263, as follows: 
"When immediate action is necessary in order to 
avert a great public calamity, private property may 
be controlled, damaged or even destroyed without com-
pensation. Under such conditions, any individual has 
the right to enter anothers land and destroy his prop-
erty and if he acts with reasonable judgment, he is not 
liable to the owner." 
A subdivision of the State has at least a right equal to 
the individual in protection against a catastrophe without 
liability. (Short vs. Pierce County, 194 Washington 421, 
78 Pac. 2d 610). 
There is no evidence in this case to show any negligence 
in the manner in which the road was raised, and apparently 
appellant so concedes, as shown on page 27 of her brief. 
It is the law that in meeting an emergency such as fire, 
flood, or pestlience, public officials may employ almost ~y 
available means in an endeavor to control the danger. 
(Short vs. Pie,rce County, supra). 
There are limitations on the doctrine denying a right 
of recovery to the land owner for damage .to his land by 
flood control measures in the exercise of the police power 
where the damaging of the property is done unnecessarily 
I : 
~) 
, 
' I " 
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and avoidably as a result of negligence on the part of the 
municipality or other governmental subdivision rather than 
under compelling emergency or with reference to the ri-
parian rights of property owners to protect themselves 
against flood water. (House of Los Angeles Flood District, 
25 Cal. 2d 384, 153 Pac. 2d 950). The Court pointed out 
that the foregoing case was not one of such emergency as 
would preclude the defendant district from being held liable 
for unnecessary damage resulting from the alleged negli-
gent planning, construction, and maintenance of a flood 
channel project. Again in Smith vs. Los Angeles, 66 Cal. 
App. 2d 562, 153 Pac. 2d 69, there was no emergency re-
quiring split second action. It is clear that the facts of the 
instant case do not bring it within the foregoing limitation. 
The evidence in the instant case does show that a great 
flood emergency exited, and defendant Spanish Fork City 
had a right to do what it did to protect itself from a com-
mon enemy, as will be more fully discussed in the following 
Point V. 
Respondent is at a loss to understand the materiality 
of what William R. Jex and Parley Neeley were concerned 
about, or what they did. There is no evidence to show that 
Either William R. Jex or Parley Neeley were authorized 
to act for, purported to act for, or did act for Spanish Fork 
City. 
POINT V 
THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE AS A MATTER OF 
LAW JUSTIFIES THE VACATING OF THE VERDICT 
OF THE JURY AND THE GRANTING OF A JUDGMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT UNDER THE 
DOCfRINE THAT FLOOD WATER IS A COMMON EN-
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EMY AGAINST WHICH A LANDOWNER MAY DO 
WHAT WAS HERE DONE TO PROTECT ITS PROPER-
TY. 
The main issue presented by this appeal is whether or 
not the so called "common enemy" doctrine is recognized 
as law in Utah and applies to the facts in this case. Al-
though respondents have been unable to find any case 
whereby this Court has expressed itself on this subject, we 
contend that the common enemy doctrine is the law of this 
State, and does apply to the facts in this case. In ruling 
on defendant Spanish Fork City's motion for summary 
judgment, the trial court was of the opinion that such was 
the law of this State, as shown by the memorandum deci-
sion of Judge Wm. Stanley Dunford dated August 10, 1954 
(R. 70 to 78 inclusive). Judge Dunford stated: 
"Be that as it may, the cited authorities supra 
seem to leave no room for doubt that the City and the 
officials of the City individually, as between them and 
the plaintiff, had full right to raise the level of the road 
in question to divert the flood waters from their threat-
ened rampage through the City and back into the chan-
nel of the river, and this Court sQ holds. If that were 
the only claim of responsibility, the cause could be 
ended here and now. It is quite a different matter, 
however, if the City, and/or its officers, by themselves, 
or by their, or any of their, agents, servants, or em-
ployees entered upon the lands of the plaintiff, or upon 
a dike which, except.for their action, might have been 
adequate to protect plaintiff's property, and dynamited 
holes through such defense in order to save themselves 
by thrusting the flood upon him." (R. 77 and 78). 
(Boldface ours). 
1 , 
I 
\ 
I 
I 
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Defendants proceeded with the trial on that basis and 
strongly objected to the admission of any evidence with 
respect to raising the elevation of the county road, which 
objections were overruled (Tr. 6 and 13). The trial court 
instructed the jury as a matter of law that the defendant 
City was not liable to the plaintiff for any damage done to 
plaintiff's land or personal property or improvements there-
on by reason of raising the elevation of the county road if 
the defendants were confronted with an extraordinary flood 
of water and the raising of the county road was to protect 
the property of the City and the property of its inhabitants 
from such flood water (Tr. 340, instruction No. 7). The 
evidence clearly showed that waters in this case are wa-
ters which had overflowed the banks of the Spanish Fork 
River due to an extraordinary flood. We are not here deal-
ing with surface waters, or even waters of an ordinary 
flood. 
Surface water is water diffused over the surface of the 
ground and derived from falling rains or melting snows, and 
it continues to be such until it reaches the well defined chan-
nels wherein it customarily flows with other waters whether 
derived from the surface or springs, whereupon it ceases to 
be surface water and becomes running water of a stream. 
(Wellman vs. Kelly, 197 Oregon 553, 252 Pac. 2d 816). 
Floods which occur annually, or at certain seasons or other 
regular intervals, and are not of unprecedented magnitude, 
are generally regarded as "ordinary floods." (Wellman vs. 
Kelly, supra). An "extraordinary flood" is a flood not fore-
shadowed by the usual course of nature, and of such magni-
tude and destructiveness as could not be anticipated or pro-
vided against by exercise of ordinary foresight. (Wellman 
vs. Kelly, supra). The main distinction between flood wa-
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ters and surface waters is that "flood waters" have broken 
away from a stream, while "surface waters" have not yet 
become a part of a water course. (McManus vs. Otis, 61 
Cal. App. 2d 432, 143 Pac. 2d 380; Southern Pacific Com-
pany vs. Proebstel, 61 Ariz. 412, 150 Pac. 2d 81). Thus, un-
der the evidence of this case, it is clear that we are dealing 
with the waters of an extraordinary flood ,Defendant's Ex-
hibit No. 29, Tr. 113, 122, 220). The cases cited by appel-
lant in her brief relating to surface waters and ordinary 
floods are not applicable to the instant case. 
The law is well settled in California that flood waters 
of a natural water course are a common enemy, against 
which the owner of land subject to overflow by those wa-
ters may protect his land qy the erection of defensive bar-
riers, and he is not liable for damages caused to lower and 
adjoining lands by the exclusion of the flood waters from 
his own property, even though the damage to other lands 
was increased thereby. (Clement vs. State R~amation 
Board, 35 Cal. App. 2d 628, 220 Pac. 2d 897; Williams vs. 
Pacific Coast Aggregates, 128 Cal. App. 2d 777, 276 Pac. 
2d 28; McManus vs. Otis, 61 Oal. App. 2d 432, 143 Pac. 2d 
380; Horton vs. Goodenough, 184 Cal. 451, 194 Pac. 34; 
Jones vs. California Development Co., 173 Cal. 565, 160 Pac. 
823; Everett vs. Davis, 18 Cal. 2d 389, 107 Pac. 2d 650; 
Mogle vs. Moore, 16 Cal. App. 2d 1, 104 Pac. 2d 785; Lamb 
vs. Reclamation, 73 Cal. 125, 14 Pac. 625). 
The Oregon court follows the principle that waters of 
an extraordinary flood constitute a "common enemy", and 
may be repelled by the owner of the land over which it flows. 
Since Oregon follows the civil rule which denies to the owner 
of one parcel of land the right to discharge the surface wa-
ter accumulating on his premises over the contiguous par-
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eels owned by another, the waters of an ordinary flood 
were held not to come within the common enemy doctrine. 
(Wellman vs. Kelly, 197 Oregon 553, 252 Pac. 2d 816). 
The Arizona court follows the principle that one can-
not obstruct the flow of surface waters in a natural water 
course onto his land, but may protect himself against flood 
waters by obstructing their flow onto his land, even though 
by such obstruction he causes the waters to flow onto an-
other's land. (Southern Pacific Company vs. Proebstel, 
61 Ariz. 412, 150 Pac. 2d 81). In the case of Southern Pa-
cific Company vs. Proebstel, supra, on page 84, the Arizona 
court referred to the case of Horton vs. Goodenough, supra, 
and quoted with approval the rules set forth therein cov-
ering the right to obstruct the flow of "surface waters" and 
"flood waters" as follows: 
"* * * First, one has no right to obstruct the flow 
onto his land of what are technically known as surface 
waters. Heier v. Krull, 160 Cal. 441, and authorities 
therein cited at page 444, 117 P. 530. But by 'surface 
waters' are not meant any waters which may be on or 
moving across the surface of the land without being 
collected into a natural watercourse. They are con-
fined to waters falling on the land by precipitation or 
rising thereon in springs. Putting it conversely, they 
do not include waters flowing out of a natural water-
course, but which yet were once a part of a stream and 
have escaped from it, 'flood waters', in other words. 
(citing cases) Second, one has the right to protect 
himself against 'flood waters', that is, waters of the 
character last described, and for that purpose to ob-
struct their flow onto his land, and this even though 
such obstruction causes the water to flow onto the land 
of another. (citing cases) Third, one may not ob-
struct or divert the flow of a natural watercourse. But 
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by a 'watercourse' is not meant the gathering of errant 
water while passing through a low depression, swale, 
or gully, but a stream in the real sense, with a definite 
channel with bed and banks, within which it flows at 
those times when the streams of the region habitually 
flow. (Citing cases)." 
In Kansas it has been held that since Kansas follows 
the common law rule whereby surface waters are consid-
ered to be a "common enemy" against which all may law-
fully impose obstructions to protect his property, waters 
of ordinary floods are a common enemy against which any 
land owner affected may protect himself. (Singleton vs. 
Atcheson, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 67 Kansas 284, 72 
Pac. 786, and Bryant vs. Merritt, 71 Kansas 272, 80 Pac. 
600). 
The State of Washington follows the common law rule 
which permits the landowner to protect his property from 
surface waters flowing from adjacent land although injucy 
to others may result. (Cass vs. Dicks, 14 Washington 75, 44 
Pac. 113). 
It is also the rule in Washington that flood waters not 
within the banks of a stream are surface waters and a com-
mon enemy against which each landowner is entitled to pro-
tect himself. (DeRuew et ux vs. Morrison, et al, 28 Wash-
ington 2d 797, 184 Pac. 2d 273). 
The rule prewiling in most jurisdictions is that a ri-
parian proprietor may, without liability for damages inci-
dentally resulting to others, so long as he acts with due 
care, erect levees, dikes, or other embankments or barriers 
to protect his property from overflow destruction or en-
croachment by any change in the natural condition of the 
stream and to prevent its· course from lbeing altered, or to 
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protect such property from injury by extraordinary floods. 
(56 Am. Jur. 581-582, Waters, Section 99). 
In the Utah case of Lasson vs. Seeley, 120 Utah 679, 
238 Pac. 2d 418, this Court held that a property owner may 
take such flood control measures on his own land as he sees 
fit, and also remedy the effects of a flood, provided that he 
does not interfere with the water rights of others. Although 
the Lasson case, supra, did not involve damage to adjacent 
property, this Court suggests the basic principle of the 
corrimon enemy doctrine, i.e., that the property owner may 
take such flood control measures on his own property as 
he sees fit. 
In the Utah case of Wilkinson vs. State, et al, 42 Utah 
483, 134 Pac. 626, it was claimed that defendants, includ-
ing the State of Utah, diverted water whkh gathered and 
flowed from certain canals and washes during rain storms 
away from their natural course or channel, to plaintiff's 
damage. This Court, despite a recovery allowed by a lower 
court, ruled that since there was no pleading or proof of 
negligence, there was no liability, even though the floods 
were not unprecedented, and further held in any event the 
State or its instrumentalities could not be sued. 
In the Utah case of Charvoz vs. Bonneville Irrigation 
District, 120 Utah 480, 235 Pac. 2d 780, this Court held that 
if a storm or act of God is of such magnitude and severity 
as to be beyond the realm of reasonable foreseeability, and 
therefore beyond the ken of the traditional reasonable, pru-
dent man, the authorities establish that negligence is sim-
ply non-existent and no liability attaches. 
Although the foregoing cases are not directly in point 
because they did not involve water which had completely 
escaped from natural channels, it appears therefrom that 
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the rule would be more clear against liability in the instant 
case. 
In 5 A. L. R. 2d 57, "Damage by F"lood Protection 
Measures", the theory underlying the common enemy doc-
trine and its application to a municipality is well pointed out 
on page 61 as follows: 
". . . . . . unless there is actual obstruction or di-
version of the natural watercourse, the damage to his 
land which the riparian landowner suffers by reason 
of flood-control measures is damnum absque injuria, 
even if caused by a private riparian landowner, and a 
fortiori so if caused by a municipality or other govern-
mental subdivision; since, while there is an injury to 
his land there is no corresponding right in him, for the 
reason that floodwaters are a common enemy against 
which any landowner or the public may take protective 
measures, without liability to another landowner who 
happens to be damaged thereby, in the absence of an 
obstruction or diversion of the natural watercourse. 
"In other words, conceding that the landowner 
would, under the constitutional provision that private 
property shall not be damaged for public use without 
just compensation, be entitled to compensation had he 
suffered a legally cognizable damage, these cases deny 
·recovery on the ground that the damage he has suf-
fered was not legally cognizable-damnum absque in-
juria-even if caused by a private landowner, and much 
less if caused by a public authority. The view is ex-
pressed in this connection that the constitutional pro-
vision against damaging of private property for public 
use without compensation does not contemplate com-
pensation for an injury to land which would have been 
otherwise non-compensable under the doctrine of dam-
num a!bsque injuria, and that the application of that 
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constitutional provision presupposes an injury other-
wise compensable." (See cases cited). 
We submit that the evidence overwhelmingly shows 
that any part which Spanish Fork City played in raising 
the elevation of the county road was to protect public and 
private property against a common enemy, and if any in-
jury resulted to plaintiff or anyone else thereby it is dam-
num absque injuria. The trial court was clearly of the same 
opinion, based upon pleadings as shown by the memoran-
dum decisi?n of Judge Dunford dated August 10, 1954 (R. 
70 to 78 inclusive). Judge Dunford stated: 
" ... There can be no question that the waters 
which did plaintiff's damage were flood waters of such 
proportions that no one could have foreseen their ex-
tent or their destructive force. The peril to property 
and even to personal safety in the vicinity of not only 
the Spanish Fork River but Hobble Creek, Provo River, 
American Fork River and other streams heading in the 
Wasatch Range of mountains was a matter of common 
knowledge. Every person threatened who had any 
opportunity to save himself was using all available 
means to protect his possessions against destruction. 
Clearly any person has a right to raise defenses against 
a common enemy such as floods, and so long as he 
merely turns wild flood waters away from his own 
property, he has no liability if as a result of his effort 
the danger to his neighbor is increased. He bas the 
right to protect bimseH but he has no duty to protec.t 
his neighbor. The latter may himself erect barriers 
for his own protection. An individual has this right 
as a matter of law. lt should be ·and is even clearer 
that the public through its organized bodies may do 
likewise and injury caused therefby is damnum absque 
injuria. Jones vs. California Development Co., 160 
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P. 823. Jackson vs. United States, 33 Sup. Ct. 1011. 
Lamb vs. Reclamation Dist., 14 P 625. Short vs. Pierce 
County, 78 P2 610. Southern Pacific Co. vs. Proeb-
stel, 150 P2 81." (R. 76-77) (Boldface ours). 
POINT VI 
THE INJURY COMPLAINED OF BY APPELLANT 
IS DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA EVEN IF CAUSED BY 
A PRIVATE LANDOWNER AND A FORTIORI SO IF 
CAUSED BY A MUNICIPALITY. 
In the California case of Clement vs. State Reclama-
tion Board, 220 Pac. 2d 897, it was held that action that 
may be taken by one for his own protection without liability 
by an individual landowner; and more so may be taken by 
the State under Article 1, Section 14, for the protection of 
all the landowners in an area without liability for damages 
~a used in defense of a common enemy (Cases cited). Ar-
ticl~ 1, Section 14, of the California Constitution is a com-
parable provision to Article 1, Section 22, of the Utah Con-
stitution. On page 902 of the Clement case, supra, the Su-
preme Court of California made the following observation, 
which is directly in point: 
"The liability of the State under Article 1, Sec~ 
tion 14 of the California Constitution arises when the 
taking or damaging of private property is not so es-
sential to the general welfare as to be sanctioned un-
der the 'police power' (citations), ,and the injury is one 
that would give rise to a cause of action on the part of 
the owner independently of the constitutional provi-
sion. (Citations) . The provision permits an action 
against the state, which cannot be sued without its 
consent. It is designed, not to create new causes of 
action,. but to give a remedy for a cause of action that 
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would otheiWise exist. The State is therefore not liable 
under this provision for an injury that is damnum 
absque injuria. If the property owner would have to 
inflict the damage, he can have no claim for compen-
sation from the State. (Citations). In the present 
case, therefore, plaintiffs have no right to compensa-
tion under article 1, section 14 if the injury is one that 
a private party would have the right to infUct without 
incurring liability." 
In the case of American Print Works v. Lawrence, 21 
NJL 248, the Supreme Court of New Jersey clearly points 
out the difference between eminent domain and the doc-
trine involved in the right to prevent catastrophe. The first 
is an attribute of sovereignty and is founded on the same 
principles as the right of raising taxes. 
"But the right to destroy property to prevent the 
spread of a conflagration rests upon other and very 
different grounds. It applies to individuals, not to the 
state. It has no necessary ,connection with or depen-
dence upon the sovereign power. It is a natural right 
existing independently of civil government. It is both 
anterior and superior from the· rights derived from the 
social compact. It springs not from the right of any 
property claimed or exercised by the agent of destruc-
tion in the property destroyed but from the law of ne-
cessity .... " 
In the present case, therefore, plaintiff has no right to 
compensation under article 1, section 22 of the Utah Consti-
tution, since the injury complained of is one that a private 
party would have the right to inflict without incurring lia-
bility. 
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POINT Vll 
THE DAMAGES FOUND BY THE JURY ARE NOT 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Counsel for plaintiff suggests in his brief that there 
may be some question as to damages, and as to whether or 
not, if the Court finds there should be liability, the dam-
ages are supported by the evidence. 
We sU!bmit that the record does not support the dam-
ages as found by the jury. The only testimony as to the 
damage to the property other than the land, was that tes-
timony of Mr. A. T. McKell, the original plaintiff, who died 
prior to the trial. We itemize this claimed damage: 
Spreader .............. $ 60.00 
50.00 
25.00 
25.00 
Hay Rake ............. . 
Spring Tooth ......... . 
Harrow .............. . 
Corral ............... . 1,212.26 
Feed Manger ......... . 408.75 
As will be set forth hereinafter, the claimed amount of 
damage of $800.15 for which defendant could in any way be 
responsible, is subsequently included in an estimate as to 
the loss to the land, and the claimed amount necessary for 
leveling of $330.00, was and should be included in the esti-
mate of the damage to the real property as set forth here-
inafter. A. T. McKell testified that because land had 
been washed away, the remaining land had depreciated• 
twenty-five per cent. Of course, his estimate was based 
upon the fact that .the land adjacent to the channel itself 
had been washed away by the river adjacent to its natu-
ral channel. In fact, the evidence shows that all but 1.87 
acres were washed away by the river next to the channel. 
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The only substantial evidence as to the damage to the 
land washed away in the cut through the Northern portion 
of plaintiff's land is the testimony of Mr. Atwood, former 
Utah County Assessor, who was called by the plaintiff. 
Mr. Atwood assumed that three to four acres of land had 
been washed away, and set the value of the land as $600.00 
per acre. His opinion as to the damage to the land in con-
sideration was based upon his estimate that three to four 
acres of land at the rate of $600.00 per acre were washed 
away. His judgment as to the maximum loss to the land 
by being washed away, including his estimate of the dam~ 
age to that land remaining, without taking into considera-
tion any claimed d~mage to the well, was $3,300.00, which 
included his estimate of repairing the fences to the North 
(Tr. 44). That was all of the fence for which defendant 
could in any way be held responsible. The estimate of the 
damage to the land according to Mr. Atwood, would have 
been less if the land washed away on the Northern portion 
of the McKell property showed a measurement of less than 
three or four acres (Tr. 39). The estimate of damage 
woul_d have been from $600.00 to $1200.00 less (Tr. 39). 
Assuming the damage was $600.00 less, the maximum dam-
age to the land would be $2,700.00, which would have in-
cluded an estimate of an amount necessary to repair that 
part of the fence for which defendant could in any way 
have been responsible. True, counsel for plaintiff, in addi-
tion to claiming damage for the land, maintained that re-
covery should be had for loss to crops occurring after the 
flood. We respectfully urge that any such claimed loss 
would be an improper element of damage, since no claim 
~as made by plaintiff therefor in his amended complaint; 
there were no allegations to support such a claim, no claim 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
38 
was filed agamst the City of Spanish Fork for such crop 
damage, and in fact counsel admitted at the trial that he 
did not make claim for damage to the crops, but that such 
eveidence 'Was merely submitted for the purpose of show-
ing the damage to the land. We submit, therefore, that 
. giving plaintiff the advantage of every bit of the doubt, the 
total amount of provable damages, based upon the figures 
of plaintiff, totals $5,189.27. The court instructed the jury 
that from the total damages found, there should be deduc-
ted the sum of $5,040.00 as amounts already paid to the 
plaintiff, or to A. T. McKell, her deceased husband. This 
leaves a total provable damage for which defendant in any 
way could be responsible of $149.27, and that, we respect-
fully submit, is a maximum. 
POINT VIII 
THE VERDICT OF THE JURY IMPOSING LIABILI-
TY UPON SPANISH FORK CITY AND EXONERATING 
THOSE THROUGH WHOM THE CITY OPERATES CAN-
NOT·BE ALLOWED TO STAND. 
The jury in this case exonerated the defendant officers 
of Spanish Fork City, through whom the City operated, 
and found liability against Spanish Fork City alone. 
The language in the recent case of Friedman, et al vs. 
llmdberg, et al, decided by Justice Crockett, Utah 
___ , 294 Pac. 2d 705, fits very nearly the fact and law 
situation in this case. We quote from page 706 of the cited 
case: 
"The principal claims of negligence against the 
Gas Co., both in the pleadings and the evidence, relate 
to the conduct of the other two defendants, Wheeler and 
Tempest, and Lundberg Plumbing Co., in conection 
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with the installation of the gas main and service fa-
cilities. The jury was obviously in eiTor in imposing lia-
bility upon the Gas Co. and exonerating those through 
whom it operated. We do not know whether the jury 
believed that the agents and Gas Co. were in fact all 
negligent and rendered a verdict against the Gas Co., 
releasing the agents because of sympathy; or, believed 
the agents were non-negligent and because of preju-
dice rendered a verdict against the Gas Co., or whether 
they misunderstood the instructions. 
"Where verdicts are inconsistent, courts have re-· 
acted variously. Some, assuming that the jury must 
have acted from prejudice against the master, order 
that judgment be entered in favor of the master not-
withstanding the verdict. Others, assuming that the 
jury was motivated by sympathy for the servant, order 
that judgment be entered against the master despite 
the inconsistency in verdicts. Yet other courts assert 
that the proper remedy requires setting aside both ver-
dicts and ordering a new trial against both master and 
servant. A reviewing court oannot ordinarily tell upon 
which basis the jury rendered its inconsistent verdicts, 
but in any event the verdicts exonerating the agents 
and holding the Gas Co. are inconsistent and cannot 
be permitted to stand." 
Thus, in the instant case, it cannot be determined 
whether or not the jury believed that the officers of Span-
ish Fork City and Spanish Fork City itself were all subject 
to liability and found against Spanish Fork City alone be-
cause of sympathy; or, believed that the officers and agents 
of Spanish Fork City were not negligent or not liable and 
because of sympathy rendered a verdict against the City; 
or whether or not they misunderstood the instructions. 
Certainly this judgment cannot lbe allowed to stand. 
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Why it was given by the jury as it was, we do not know. 
We suspect that because evidence was allowed over ob· 
jections that the State of Utah and Utah County had each 
voluntarily contributed $2,000.00 that eveh though the jury 
could not under the evidence and the instructions find lia-
bility, they allowed a verdict in substantially the same 
amount against Spanish Fork City. We respectfully urge 
and submit that in addition to the other substantial reasons 
to support the trial court in granting judgment notwith-
standing the verdict, the inconsistency of the verdict as de-
scribed herein itself is sufficient to support the judgment 
of the trial court. For this Honorable Court to find other-
wise, it would be required to do so in direct conflict with the 
holding of the Friedman case, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court did not err in allowing the amendments 
to the defendant's pleadings for the reasons fully discussed 
under Point I. The damages found by the jury are clearly 
not supported by the evidence. Resolving all doubts in fa-
vor of the plaintiff, $149.27 is the maximum which could 
be supported by the evidence. In exonerating the officers 
and employees of defendant Spanish Fork City, the jury 
either misunderstood the instructions, or found against 
Spanish Fork City alone because of sympathy. Under the 
law of this State, such a verdict cannot be permitted to 
stand, as is fully discussed in Point VIII. 
In following the outline set forth in appellant's brief, 
we have separately discussed the law as it applies to the 
facts that: 
1. Respondent was acting in a governmental capacity. 
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2. A great emergency existed; and 
3. Respondent had a right to do as it did to protect 
its property and inhabitants from a common enemy. 
The evidence as discussed under each point shows that 
all of the above conditions were concurrent at the time of 
the claimed damage. The applicable law in the instant case 
should not be limited to that which the courts have applied 
in each separate case, but rather should be the law as it ap-
plies to a combination of all of the above facts. 
The common law doctrine which permits a landowner 
to erect barriers to protect and defend his property against 
a common enemy such as a flood is and should be the law 
of this State. The doctrine is applicable to the facts of this 
case, and respondent cannot be held liable for the damages 
claimed, since such damages are damnum absque injuria. 
Respondent respectfully submits that the trial court 
properly set aside the verdict of the jury and entered judg-
ment of no cause of action for defendant Spanish Fork City. 
Not only was the action of the trial court proper, but it was 
necessary to prevent a great miscarriage of justice. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHILLIP V. CHRISTENSON 
JOSEPH NOVAK 
For CHRISTENSON, NOVAK & PAULSON 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Ashton Building 
Provo,Utah 
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